

# **SCAR Action Group History of Antarctic Research**

## **2<sup>nd</sup> SCAR Workshop**

**on the**

**History of Antarctic Research**

**21 –22 September, 2006**

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile**

**Santiago, Chile**

**Programme**

**Booklet of Abstracts**

**Venue: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Edificio José Miguel  
Carrera, Cardinal Samoré Conference Centre, 17<sup>th</sup> Floor,  
Teatinos 180, Santiago, Chile.**

Editor and layout: Cornelia Lüdecke, University of Hamburg, Germany

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# **“Multidimensional exploration of Antarctica around the 1950s”**

**2<sup>nd</sup> SCAR Workshop on the History of Antarctic Research, Santiago (Chile)  
21 to 22 September 2006.**

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Edificio José Miguel Carrera, Cardinal Samoré  
Conference Centre, 17<sup>th</sup> Floor, Teatinos 180, Santiago, Chile.

## **PROGRAMME**

### **Thursday 21 September 2006**

**8: 30-9:00 Registration**

**09:00-9:30 Workshop Welcome and Opening**

**José Retamales**, Director, Chilean Antarctic Institute, Punta Arenas

**Cornelia Lüdecke**, President of SCAR Action Group History of Antarctic  
Research, Munich, Germany

**9:30-13:00 Session I**

**09:30-10:30 The Polar Years: the path from Exploration to Cooperation**

**Eugenio Genest**, Instituto Antártico Argentino, Argentina

**10:30-11:30 The intellectual sources of the Antarctic Treaty**

**Jorge Berguño**, Chilean Antarctic Institute, Santiago, Chile

**11:30-11:45 Coffee Break**

**11:45-12:15 *Discussion of written contribution I***

**The logic of risk assessment in the planning for the IGY**

**Lisbeth Lewander**, University of Göteborg, Göteborg, Sweden

**12:15-13:00 British initiatives in the making of an Antarctic Treaty (1956-59)**

**Nelson Llanos Sierra**, Universidad de Playa Ancha, Chile

**13:00-14:00 Lunch**

**14:00-18:30 Session II**

14:00-15:00 **Chilean Antarctic Science, 1946-1959**

**Adrian Howkins**, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, USA

15:00-15.45 **India and Antarctica in 1956**

**Mauricio Jara**, Universidad de Playa Ancha, Chile

15:45-16:00 *Book Presentation*

**Mauricio Jara, M. Consuelo León Wöppke, Jason Kendall**

**16:00-16:30 Coffee Break**

16:30-17:15 **US Antarctic Policy in the Fifties.**

**Jason Kendall Moore**, University of Tasmania, Australia

17:15-18:30 **When Titans Clash, Something Has To Give”: The U.S. Antarctic Mind in the mid-1950s**

**M. Consuelo León Wöppke**, Universidad Marítima de Chile, Chile

**20:00 Workshop dinner**

*(Place to be announced during the morning session)*

**Friday 22 September 2006**

**9:00-12:45 Session III**

09:00-10:00 **Expanding to Antarctica – Discussions about German naming and a new map of Antarctica in the early 1950s**

**Cornelia Lüdecke**, University of Hamburg, Germany

10:00-11:00 **Belgian-Dutch Antarctic cooperation in the 1960's: the policy behind it**

**Peter Abbink**, Arctic Centre, Groningen, The Netherlands

**11:00-11:15 Coffee Break**

- 11:15-12:00 ***Discussion of written contribution II***  
**Glacial and Permafrost Exploration in the Dry Valleys During the 1957/58 IGY: The personal records of Troy L. Péwé.**  
**Brian F. Gootee, USA**
- 12:00-12:45 **The Soviet Preparation for the IGY Antarctic Program and the Australian Response: Politics and Science**  
**Irina Gan, University of Tasmania, Australia**
- 12:45-13:45 Lunch**
- 13:45-16:30 Session IV**
- 13:45-14:45 **An Early European Attempt to Launch an Ice Coring Project in Antarctica - long before EPICA**  
**Aant Elzinga, University of Göteborg, Göteborg, Sweden**
- 14:45-15:15 **Final discussion**
- 15:15-16:30 ***Preparation of next SCAR Workshop.***

End of Workshop 16:30



## **Belgian-Dutch Antarctic cooperation in the 1960s: the policy behind it**

**Peter Abbink**, Arctic Centre, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands

In the period from 1963 until 1967 there were three Belgian-Dutch over wintering expeditions to Antarctica. Belgium had already an Antarctic tradition. It was the Belgian Adrien de Gerlache de Gomery (1866-1934) who led the first expedition that over wintered in the Antarctic in 1899. Belgium had participated in the International Geophysical Year in 1958. The country was one of the twelve original signatories of the Antarctic Treaty. The Netherlands had no Antarctic tradition at all.

In this presentation I will focus on the policy behind these expeditions. Why did Belgium and the Netherlands cooperate in Antarctic research in this period? How and why did this cooperation start? How did the cooperation work on the policy level? Why did the cooperation end so soon?

The son of Adrien de Gerlache, the late Gaston de Gerlache de Gomery (1919-2006) played a decisive role in the Belgian-Dutch cooperation in Antarctica. He was the catalyst and the driving force of the cooperation. The Belgian government had several motives to cooperate with the Netherlands. These motives included financial considerations, international prestige, scientific motives, internal tensions in Belgian Antarctic circles, and considerations on security policy. Considerations on security policy catalysed the start of the involvement of the Dutch government. These considerations soon made way for scientific motives.

The Belgian-Dutch cooperation was not on an equal footing. Belgium was the leader of the expeditions. The country owned the Antarctic base which was used for the expeditions, and the country paid two third of the expedition costs. The Netherlands paid one third of the costs. The Belgian involvement in the policymaking of the Belgian-Dutch cooperation was centred on the non-scientist De Gerlache and the involvement had also a more political character. In Belgium, the usual institutions for international scientific cooperation in Antarctic science – the universities, scientific institutions, the academies of sciences, the Belgian SCAR committee, and the *National Centre for Polar Research* – were not involved. The Dutch involvement in the policymaking was more independent of the government. In the

Netherlands, the usual structure of academic institutions was involved. as a consequence, there was a kind of clash of cultures.

In Antarctica, the scientists worked well and loyally. Nevertheless, the Belgian-Dutch cooperation ended abruptly in a quarrelsome atmosphere on the policy level. This break was initiated when the Dutch financing institution, the *Organisation for Pure Scientific Research* (ZWO) faced cuts in its budget.

This oral paper is part of my PhD research '*Dutch Antarctic policy and research since 1945, in comparison with that of Belgium and Germany*'.

## **The Intellectual Sources of the Antarctic Treaty**

**Jorge Berguño**, Chilean Antarctic Institute, Santiago, Chile

1. This presentation endeavours to describe and assess the multiple factors which influence and to a certain point determine the present legal, political and scientific condition of Antarctica. Starting points are the peculiar nature of the “Ice Continent”, its roots in the myth of the *Terra Australis*, the Papal Bulls of 1493 and the Treaty of Tordesillas, as well as other ensuing European Treaties, including the 1790 Nootka Sound Treaty, the General Act of the 1885 Berlin African Conference, the 1908 Declaration of St. Petersburg on a Baltic *status quo*, and the 1920 Svalbard Treaty. The issue at stake is the soundness of assimilation of the “Ice Continent” to traditional concepts of law stemming from Roman Law.
2. The following step deals with the actual practice of States concerned with Antarctica before the International Geophysical Year (IGY), with emphasis on the special treatment or regime governing scientific research , exchange of personnel and designation of observers, limitations applied to naval activity, meteorological

cooperation in the Southern Ocean, assistance to Antyartic expeditions and postal services. All these elements pre-existed and influenced the practice of the IGY and produced a status quo on the basis of the so-called “Gentleman’s Agreement” at the Paris and Brusells “Antarctic Conferences” which was subsequently codified by the Antarctic Treaty.

3. The Antarctic Treaty was in fact negotiated for more than a decade. Nevertheless, such negotiation really started when some attempts at territorial delimitation or transfer failed (negotiation of a Complementary Delimitation Treaty in Antarctica between Argentina & Chile, 1906-1908; Anglo-Argentinean negotiation concerning the South Orkney Islands, 1912-1914); the dispute settlement procedure was seen as inapplicable (rejection by Argentina and Chile of the UK invitation to take the dispute to the International Court of Justice); and most States concerned with Antarctica rejected proposals for an international status under the United Nations. Discarding these options resulted in enhanced aspirations towards a settlement within the framework of an international conference by the main actors in an emerging “Antarctic System”.
4. Three conceptual dimensions, each striving for supremacy, characterized the negotiations previous to the final invitation issued by the USA in 1958 to the Washington Conference:
  - a) an Antarctic status quo.
  - b) an Antarctic condominium.
  - c) an Antarctic international regime.

The “Escudero Declaration” symbolizes the “status quo” type of arrangement.

The 1948 American proposals involve merging all claims in one.

British proposals (1957-58) aim at the creation of an international entity.

5. Underlying all these rival concepts there is a common assumption: that Antarctica must be preserved as a peaceful region dedicated to scientific research. While much attention has been devoted to the political issues involving disarmament, the so-called “freezing” of the claims and the mechanics of decision-making within the Antarctic Treaty, and much less to the intellectual transfers from the IGY to the Treaty System. The key to these transfers is provided by concept of freedom of scientific research

within the treaty which, to be properly understood, must reflect not only the discussions of article II of the Treaty within the Washington Conference, but the meaning of the words “ as applied during the International Geophysical Year”.

## **Early European Attempt to Launch an Ice Coring Project in Antarctica – long before EPICA**

**Aant Elzinga**, University of Göteborg, Sweden

After IGY scientific interest in Antarctica continued to grow. Realization of such interests on a large scale was however beyond the capacity of all but a few nations. In Europe only two of the parties to the Antarctic Treaty, France and the UK, maintained a presence in Antarctica. Smaller nations like Belgium and Norway found it economically prohibitive to undertake any major operation, while at the same time new technological advances relating to glaciology interested and motivated scientists in several other nations in exploring the option to do something jointly on a European basis. The Council of Europe situated in Strasbourg was seen as the possible political vehicle to seek backing for such an enterprise.

Therewith emerged the concept of a European Antarctic Project (EAP), discussed and articulated from 1970-1975, but finally failing because of the inability to agree about a suitable multinational managerial structure. This now forgotten initiative was in some respects a forerunner of the European Project for Ice Coring in Antarctica (EPICA) that got going after many meetings in the early 1990s. The EAP-concept, like EPICA, was mainly focused around glaciological work on the ice sheet, including deep core drilling to be undertaken on Dronning Maud Land. The geological and geophysical component was much weaker, something noted by SCAR's glaciological group that was otherwise positive to a possible complement to the International Antarctic Glaciological Programme in which Australia, France, the US and USSR had joined forces, leading to some pioneering deep ice coring, among other the efforts associated with the famous Vostok core later.

The IAGP for its part was in part spurred by an international symposium (proceedings published with SCAR) on Antarctic Glaciological Exploration held in the US Sept. 1968. IAGP became important for laying down guidelines for standardization of methods along traverses, geophysical measurements, determining physical and chemical properties of ice, radioactivity, retrieving ice cores ice core drilling and much more. Standardization was an important question following the development various new technologies that during the decade following IGY opened entirely new possibilities for mapping the ice sheet, its dynamics and what was under it. The realization that with new technologies an understanding of climate variations going back 100,000 years BP also emerged.

The present paper outlines the background to the discussions 1970-1975 of an EAP. The pertinent technological developments during the decade following upon IGY are reviewed, as are the scientific and political motives behind the project. It will be noted how some of the leading personalities that participated in the discussions became important actors in the events that led to EPICA twenty years later, while some of the research tasks that had been spelled out in the meantime had been absorbed in the IAGP and other programmes in which the two superpowers plus Australia, France and the UK in various ways played the major roles.

## **The Soviet Preparation for the IGY Antarctic Program and the Australian Response: Politics and Science**

**Irina Gan**, Institute of Antarctic & Southern Ocean Studies, University of Tasmania, Australia

After the end of World War II and the victory over Nazi Germany in 1945, the Soviet Union, although devastated by the war effort, found itself in an extremely powerful political position. The meeting between Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill, the heads of the governments of the USSR, USA and the United Kingdom, in the Crimean city of Yalta virtually decided the future political landscape of Europe and the USSR became a major world power.

Consequently when on the August 9, 1948, the United States Government circulated to the Governments of Australia, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Argentina, Chile, France and Norway proposals for an eight-power condominium in Antarctica as a solution to the problem of conflicting territorial claims that deliberately excluded the USSR, the latter could not accept such a proposal. Although the USA was not making any territorial claims in Antarctica itself, nor was it supporting anybody else's claims, the reaction in the USSR to an arrangement that attempted to exclude it from a vast continent that had potential economic, strategic and global political significance came fairly quickly.

A non-government scientific body, the All-Union Geographical Society, convened a meeting attended by 400 scientists in Leningrad on February 10, 1949, where the President of the Society, Academician Lev Semenovitch Berg delivered the main address entitled "Russian discoveries in the Antarctic and its present day interests". He pointed out that historically Russia, and by succession the USSR had the right of priority of discovering a number of Antarctic lands by the First Russian Antarctic Expedition 1819-1821 commanded by Captain Thaddeus Bellingshausen. Priority in discovery was seen as an extremely important factor in establishing territorial claims because rights are said to accrue from it.

That a Soviet non-government institution took an interest in foreign policy should come as no surprise. Both foreign and internal state policy was formulated and directed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Party membership was an essential requirement for holding any government or non-government executive position. Party policy was paramount and was followed by all institutions. It is helpful to bear this in mind when considering the workings of the Soviet system.

The meeting of the All-Union Geographical Society adopted a resolution urging the Soviet Government to participate in any international settlement concerning Antarctica, and on June 7, 1950 the Soviet Government delivered a memorandum based on the deliberations of the Society to the governments of Argentina, Australia, France, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States, where it was stated that no solution of the problem of a regime for the Antarctic without the participation of the Soviet Union can have legal force, and the USSR has every reason not to recognize any such solution.

The historical context of the memorandum was the mutual suspicion of the Cold War, when the Western and Communist world were in an intense competition to show the superiority of their respective economies and ideologies. The West's suspicious attitude was illustrated in an article by the Director of the British Royal Geographical society, L. P Kirwan, who called the Memorandum "a new and curious development in the cold war", saying that the Soviet Union "has found a new and admirable field for her talent for political warfare and for diversionary and dividing tactics".

The Soviet Union saw it rather as a legitimate protection of its own interests. When the American scientist, Dr Lloyd Berkner suggested in April 1950 that a third International Polar Year (IPY) be held in 1957, the Soviets already had a scientific community and public that was very much aware of the Antarctic and its significance for their country, since the popular media had been reporting widely on the deliberations of the Geographical Society and on Antarctica in general.

After the International Council of Scientific Unions commenced planning for the IPY and in 1953 expanded the scope from polar to global, renaming it the International Geophysical Year (IGY), a group of scientists from the Department of Marine Expeditions of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR met unofficially in Moscow in 1954 and took the initiative in ensuring Soviet participation in the IGY.

An official Interdepartmental Committee of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR responsible for preparing and conducting the IGY research program, processing the research data and publishing the results was also established by the USSR Government in the same year.

The outcome of the work of the Soviet official and unofficial committees was the decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR in July 1955 establishing a First Soviet Composite Antarctic Expedition (CAE). It was a project of national significance, and many of the USSR's highly qualified scientists, best polar pilots and navigators and most experienced Arctic men were diverted from their work in the Arctic to apply their skills and knowledge in pioneering studies and infrastructure development in Antarctica. Three of the USSR's most modern icebreakers were fitted out especially for the expedition.

It was a huge and expensive project, though the government was able to recoup over 70% of the Antarctic expedition's foreign currency expenses by chartering one of the expedition's ships on the return journey from Antarctica to deliver grain from Australia to Germany.

The CAE was to consist of two parts: a continental and a marine expedition. The first was to operate on the continent year round, whereas the second was to conduct research using expedition ships in coastal Antarctic waters and in the open sea.

The main task of the First CAE in 1955-1957 was to make preparations for the requirements of the Soviet IGY commitment, including building a main coastal base, which was named *Mirny* after one of the two sloops which took part in Bellingshausen's expedition. Other aims included preparatory work in selecting sites for the inner continental polar stations.

Most of the Soviet research and building activity of the CAE was occurring in the sector of Antarctica which is claimed by Australia [which the latter refers to as the Australian Antarctic Territory (AAT)] with *Mirny* and the two smaller stations *Pionerskaya* and *Oasis* being located there. The Australian government was uncomfortable with the presence of the USSR on the AAT, especially since the USSR not only did not recognize any territorial claims in the Antarctic, but reserved its own right to claim territory. Australia was faced with a dilemma. Although it was extremely wary of the USSR's intentions in Antarctica and of any potential future territorial claims that it may make, it could not prevent the USSR from participating in the IGY research program in the Australian sector. It also could not communicate directly with the USSR Government because diplomatic relations between Australia and the USSR had been broken off in 1954 due to the defection of an alleged KGB agent, Vladimir Petrov, from the Soviet Embassy in Australia's capital, Canberra. Communication was conducted through the British Embassy in Moscow, which on August 29, 1955 delivered a message from the Australian Government to the USSR Government welcoming the Soviet interest in the IGY.

A reply was received on November 2, 1955 when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR delivered a note to the United Kingdom embassy in Moscow acknowledging Australia's readiness to assist, stating that the work of the expedition would also be considerably lightened if the Soviet Antarctic expedition ship were provided with the necessary servicing in the event of its calling at one of the ports of Australia or Tasmania.

The Australian position was that if the Soviets at the conclusion of IGY gave indications of retaining their bases in the Antarctic, consideration would be given to depriving them of support from the Australian mainland. Australian External Affairs Minister Richard Casey considered that Australia's long term hope of holding the Antarctic depends upon United States support. Australian Polar explorer Douglas Mawson did not share Casey's concerns about the USSR's territorial ambitions in Antarctica, but considered that the USA's policy of not recognizing territorial claims may push the USSR to stay in Antarctica.

The question of whether or not the USSR intended to prolong its stay on the Antarctic continent was a matter that concerned Australian analysts for several years. The resources in manpower and technology that the Soviets expended in preparing for the IGY gave an indication of their commitment to a substantial presence in Antarctica, making it impossible to find a satisfactory political solution for a workable Antarctic regime without significant Soviet input. Although science may have been one of the ways of gaining a political foothold on the Antarctic continent, it would seem that, from a contemporary perspective, it has led to a far greater level of international cooperation than was possible using political means only.

## **The Polar Years: the path from Exploration to Cooperation**

**Eugenio Genest**, Instituto Antártico Argentino, Argentina

This work aims to point out the search by both the Argentinean citizens and the governmental action in order to carry out first Antarctic exploration and discovery of Antarctic features and then to improve the scientific survey of Antarctic physical characteristics and Antarctic resources.

Essays to reach a deep knowledge of this continent have been multiple and this would be a challenge for the Argentine Republic concerning both its people and its resources.

We will mention the Instituto Geográfico Argentino as the organization that sponsored such scientific interest during the XIX century, as well as at the beginning of the XX century, in support of other expeditions, with the establishment of a lighthouse and Observatory off the Isla de los Estados (Isla Año Nuevo) in 1902, and subsequently, started its Antarctic activity in 1904 with the installation and operation at Orcadas station of the meteorological and magnetic Observatory.

Such initiatives have been ongoing until the creation of the Comisión Nacional del Antártico in 1940, that marked a clear research line in the whole Argentinean Antarctic activity, preparing Argentina's participation in the International Geophysical Year.

## **Chilean Antarctic Science, 1946-1959**

**Adrian Howkins**, Department of History, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, USA

This paper will investigate the development of Chilean Antarctic science between 1946 and 1959. It will pay particular attention to the political context in which Chilean science developed, with a focus on the sovereignty dispute that was taking place during these years in Antarctica between Chile, Argentina, and Great Britain. The observation that science and politics were inextricably connected during this period - as much for Chile as for Argentina, Great Britain, the United States, and for all the countries involved in the International Geophysical Year - is not particularly profound. But by tracing how the relationship between Chilean Antarctic science and Chilean Antarctic politics developed over this period, this paper hopes to provide a deeper insight into why Chile conducted scientific research in Antarctica during these years, what sort of science it performed, and what results it obtained. More generally, the history of the development of Chilean Antarctic science between 1946 and 1959, offers an interesting way to look at some of the broader themes of this period, such as the search for a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute, or the politicization of the IGY. Seen from the Chilean perspective many of the traditional narratives of Antarctic history

- such as the idea that the IGY spontaneously generated the goodwill that led to the Antarctic Treaty - start to break down, and we get a better sense of the inherent complexity and contradictions of this history.

## **India and Antarctica in 1956**

**Mauricio Jara**, Universidad de Playa Ancha, Chile

Based on Chilean newspaper sources, this paper analyses the context and content of the 1956 Indian initiative related to the Antarctic.

In the proposal which it considered presenting to the United Nations, India called for Antarctica to be internationalized and to become the world's only region in which all atomic and thermonuclear tests were to be forbidden. It is amazing that the former British colony, which had only just achieved independence and was a weak member of the Non-Alignment Movement, was able to provoke such international commotion during the preparatory meeting of the International Geophysical Year (IGY) and, according to the Chilean historian Mario Barros van Buren, produced a common front of opposition among nations with Antarctic interests.

This paper clarifies why India threatened to table its proposal, and what it expected to gain if it were to do so. Did it want to split the Afro-Latin American bloc, or was it only seeking to gain international "prestige"?

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## **When Titans Clash, Something Has To Give”: The U.S. Antarctic Mind in the mid-1950s**

**M. Consuelo León Wöppke**, Universidad Marítima de Chile, Chile

The paper analyses, from the Chilean perspective, the American perceptions of the Antarctic situation in the mid-1950s. The metaphor is drawn from the comment of an American journalist in relations to the “ice-jaws” in Little America.

Everything that a power did or avoided doing in this era was seen through the lenses of the Cold War. Both superpowers viewed the emptiness of as a “vacuum” which if it did not fill, the other would. The White Continent also ideal for garnering national prestige through exploration, scientific discoveries, and so forth.

In this regard the United States was competing with the Soviet Union on several fronts among which Antarctica was the least dangerous, as it entailed virtually no risk of overt hostilities. It was also an ideal forum in which to display—in the name of international cooperation—its latest military aircraft, land machines, and old-fashioned bravery, that is, the ability to survive the harshest elements on the planet.

The Soviet Union and European nations were doing the same. As they had more limited financial and human resources, they were eager to maximize what they had at their disposal, whether experience in the Arctic or simple perseverance. Soviet and British explorers made an impressive display of walking across the Antarctic, a feat which Argentina and Chile were unable or unwilling to match.

Prince Phillip was despatched to the area in hope of enhancing Britain’s declining leadership in the world, yet it was obviously unprepared to compete with the foremost Antarctic “titans” otherwise known as superpowers. The British therefore decided to play a secondary but important role backing U.S. decisions in the scientific-political contest.

So what gave, as Americans might have asked each other as they waited for some government, preferably their own, to assume a leadership role. What would “give” or transpire would be preliminary negotiations in Washington in which none of the involved

nations would be expected to surrender any of their rights. Instead, as there were few alternatives, they would opt to “give in” to the need for international cooperation.

## **Chile and Australia: Antarctic Relations in the mid-1950s**

**Nelson Llanos Sierra**, Universidad Marítima de Chile, Chile

This paper analyzes Chilean–Australian Antarctic relations in the mid-1950s, a topic which remains largely unexplored.

In the considered period, the Antarctic context was physically and politically altered by the establishment of Soviet bases in Australian Antarctic Territory. Despite the scientific value of these bases, they generated much apprehension among the other nations active in the region, who doubted that Soviet motivations were purely scientific.

This paper dwells on the effort of Chilean diplomats to establish a common policy with Australia to counteract possible Soviet “advances,” as well as to limit the extent of British influence on Antarctic Australian policy and the 1957–1958 International Geophysical Year (IGY) at large.

## **The Logic of Risk Assessment in the Planning for the IGY**

**Lisbeth Lewander**, Department of Gender Studies, Göteborg University, Sweden

Most people easily may imagine the risks involved in doing science in distant polar areas. Would it not be safer, cheaper and more convenient to simply avoid the situations causing possible hazards such as in polar exploration, Thus, is there any logic whatsoever in

consciously planning for those relatively great risks? Most persons are willing to tune down the dangers and simply deliver a positive answer to the latter question without any major hesitation. Some will spare a thought for the heroism involved, some will note that polar areas are reserved for “real” men but most persons would acknowledge that without a certain amount of risk taking nothing would ever take place as to scientific, societal or personal development. Future benefits, although sometimes not very well defined as to scale and scope, do incorporate certain degree of risk taking. Thus, why not continue to exercise and improve calculations for risks, assess the probabilities for hazards and/or casualties and just get down to business – safe logistics and transportation in support of science? As for polar exploration, polar history is laden with more or less thoughtful planning for risks as well as with actual and often successful crisis management regardless of the content of earlier planning.

The point of departure for this paper is that certainly there is logic of risk assessment in most polar explorations from early history until this very day, but this logic needs to be reflected upon from a historical and societal point of view apart. Important issues of logistics, transports and safety measures are often taken for granted in the sense of being thought of as neutral topics. Instead I would like to emphasize the need to dissect and problematize what I have labelled the “logic” of risk assessment. Further, the concept of “risk assessment” itself needs to be explored somewhat more in-depth. In addition the issue of risk communication will be introduced as a theme since no polar exploration of today is likely to be carried out in the absence of such communication. My argument is that already 50 years ago both risk assessments as well as risk communication were crucial issues, although the wording and conceptualization was different.

I have chosen to focus on the planning for the IGY, from 1950 to 1956 and the paper will provide examples from several different countries as well as examples related to various levels of analysis such as the individual, organisational and symbolical. As a healthy reminder of the links between today and previous eras - apparently, security and issues of risks are strengthening their positions vis-à-vis other issues on the agenda within the scientific communities and Antarctic operators within SCAR and COMNAP, since a new working group was formed on these issues as late as July 2006.

## **Expanding to Antarctica – Discussions about German Naming and a new Map of Antarctica in the early 1950s**

**Cornelia Lüdecke**, Centre for the History of Science, Mathematics and Technology, University of Hamburg, Germany

When the third German Antarctic expedition (1938/39) had finished its areal-photogrammetric investigation of the new discovered Neuschwabenland and ice free mountain ranges a list of names was proposed by the leader of the „Schwabenland“ expedition Alfred Ritscher (1879-1963) (Ritscher 1942). Due to World War II this list was never published in the *Bundesanzeiger* (Federal Advertiser) to make them official names (Ritscher 1950). Instead the Norwegian government had claimed the area of Neuschwabenland for Norway on 14 January 1939, when the German expedition still was underway to Antarctica, and immediately afterwards Norwegian names were put on the Norwegian map.

After Richard Evelyn Byrd's (1888-1957) “Highjump” campaign (1946-1947) and the investigation of the western part of the mountain region of Neuschwabenland by the Norwegian-British-Swedish Antarctic Expedition (1949-52), Antarctica became visible again in the headlines of German newspapers. Johannes Georgi (1888-1972), leader of Station “Ice Centre” during the Alfred Wegener expedition to Greenland (1930-31), focussed on the subject of research in Antarctica and the problem of naming (Georgi 1949). This was a crucial problem, because after World War II use of the name “Neuschwabenland” was forbidden by the “Regulations for the publication of maps” of 14. April 1949 as a description of the area discovered and mapped by the third German Antarctic Expedition (GAE 1938/1939). This ban was not reversed until 23 November 1950.

In 1951, when the proposal for a third International Polar Year was accepted by the International Council of Scientific Unions, German geographer Hans-Peter Kosack (born in 1912) published a new map of Antarctica with the scale 1:4.000.000, in which he used colour and international names for description. A more generalised map of the scale 1:11.250.000 was added to his paper to depict the main geographical features of the ice covered continent. The map still in use at that time had been published by the American Geographical Society in 1929. Since then, many important geographic discoveries had been made: Graham Land was seen to be a peninsula and not an archipelago, the largest glacier of Antarctica had been found

west of Adelie Land, a mountain range of about 3000 m height had been found in Queen Mary Land and a deep bay at 135 °W. Besides there was a new reconstruction of the map of Neuschwabenland, with corrected positions and heights.

Georgi published a long paper about naming in Antarctica in which he explained its importance. Naming showed the scientific priority of the discoverer, if no prior claim existed. Thus naming acknowledged scientific achievement . Several steps were required before naming something. The first names for new discoveries was used in working maps during an expedition. The next step was to gain the agreement of national scientists and their government. Then the new name had to be accepted by the nation with territorial claims in the area, to be acknowledged internationally, and to be used on new maps. Finally Georgi explained the rationale for the German names for features in Neuschwabenland, referring to geographical features, expedition members, and well-known polar researchers or geographers. He did not encourage the use of names of political persons of the National Socialist Regime. In taking the step of declining the use of some of the original German names for Neuschwabenland features, Georgi was being controversial, because he gave a full list of 63 German place names with additional explanation of their origin, including „Conrad Gebirge“, “Kurze-Gebirge” and “Wohlthat-Massiv“ and others named after persons in prominent positions of the NS bureaucracy, but without mentioning their military or bureaucratic positions.

Georgi’s paper gave rise to many arguments between him and Ritscher which will be described in the paper. As a result of Georgi’s initiative, the German Foreign Ministry officially published a list of 84 Antarctic place names in the Bundesanzeiger (Federal Advertiser) of 12 July 1952, which summarized the new names introduced onto the map by the third GAE 1938/1939. This list did not eliminate any of the names originally proposed in 1939.

The revised naming process, and the reconstruction of the Neuschwabenland map in the late 1950s in the wake of the International Geophysical Year (1957-1958) had its correspondence in the 1980s, when the Federal Republic of Germany was admitted to Consultative Status of the Antarctic Treaty in 1981. At that time a new map of Neuschwabenland was constructed, with new techniques, and the names of features were further revised. Finally a list of 427

names were presented including 96 names connected with the GAE 1938/39. Today we find a mixture of Norwegian and German names on the maps.

## **The Idea of Progress from the French Encyclopedia to the Antarctic Treaty**

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The idea of progress, dominant in Western thought for over two centuries, began to falter after the Second World War. Humanity's attempt to liberate itself from gods and kings appeared to have given way to a struggle between communism and capitalism, a far more dangerous version of the struggle between the Ancients and the Moderns—in which both sides claimed to be Modern. In 1950 John Baille observed that actual progress had become unlikely as the Cold War had divided the world into two blocs which actively exported their systems of government, breeding hostilities which held the capacity to destroy the planet. He compared the idea of progress to a relentlessly advancing disease whose victims were either unable or unwilling to recognize the symptoms.

By the end of the decade, the arms race had spiraled out of control and there were few indications that it could be halted, yet the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 suggested that the superpowers had accepted the need for peaceful coexistence. The treaty was based on the second U.S. internationalization proposal which had been extended to the Soviet Union and called for indefinitely suspending the territorial dispute and devoting the continent to scientific cooperation. Many authors have hailed it as triumph for humankind and by default a testament to the enlightened nature of U.S. leadership. However, recently declassified papers indicate that, as widely feared at the time, U.S. officials sought to use the Antarctic as a nuclear testing ground.

The Antarctic Treaty can nonetheless be viewed as updating the eighteenth-century idea of progress, specifically as championed by the French *Encyclopedia* which repudiated all forms

of superstition and placed unbounded faith in the reason, goodness and beauty of human nature. It promoted knowledge not for its own sake but as a means of bettering humanity, as the Antarctic Treaty promoted scientific cooperation in hope of reducing international tensions or, at least, exempting one region from geopolitical calculations. Most importantly it included the first nuclear test ban in history which four years later was carried further by the global test ban signed by the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain.

This presentation discusses the following issues: French *Encyclopedia*; the controversy from which the Antarctic Treaty emerged; and the anti-nuclear movement led by many of the physicists who had been involved with the Manhattan Project and who in many ways felt betrayed by the U.S. government. The presentation then offers a highly interpretive synthesis.

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